Kim Jong Un’s Daughter Ju-ae Receives Separate Salutes from North Korean Troops… Something Unusual Is Unfolding?

It is time to pay closer attention to Kim Ju-ae’s movements

2025-12-13     최보식

[Choice Times=Jang Sung-min, Chair of the People Power Party Ansan Gap Chapter (Former Senior Secretary for Future Strategy Planning, Presidential Office)]

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North Korea’s Workers’ Party newspaper Rodong Sinmun reported last month that a ceremony marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean Air Force was held on November 28 at Galma Airfield, home to the 59th Gil Yong-jo Hero Regiment of the Second Air Force Division.

Chairman Kim Jong Un attended the event accompanied by his daughter, Ju-ae. Later, Korean Central Television broadcast footage showing Ju-ae receiving salutes from officers on her own, without her father present. (Editor’s note)

Kim Ju-ae made another public appearance. On November 28, she appeared alongside Kim Jong Un at the 80th anniversary ceremony of the North Korean Air Force, wearing a black leather coat. North Korean state media treated her as a special figure, referring to her with the honorific title “the respected daughter.”

Her appearance came just three months after Kim Jong Un accompanied her to China’s Victory Day commemoration in September. Many diplomats interpreted Kim’s decision to bring Ju-ae to the event in China as a diplomatic signal intended to indicate that she is his chosen successor.

When Kim Jong Un traveled to China to attend the Victory Day ceremony with Ju-ae, he appeared to have had two objectives. One was to signal to China—given the North Korea–China relationship often described as “lips and teeth” (inseparable allies)—that Ju-ae is effectively his successor. The other was to use the occasion, when global attention was focused on China’s Victory Day, to introduce Ju-ae to the world.

Kim Jong Un appears to have achieved both objectives. Perhaps for that reason, Ju-ae’s appearance at the Air Force’s 80th anniversary ceremony looked markedly different. Her movements appeared far more autonomous and independent, clearly distinct from the image of a mere attendant trailing behind Kim Jong Un, as seen in the past.

After saluting Kim Jong Un, senior Air Force generals also rendered separate hand salutes to Ju-ae. Scenes in which Ju-ae followed independently after Kim Jong Un completed an honor guard review and bowed to the Air Force flag, as well as scenes where Kim encouraged Air Force pilots and Ju-ae followed at a measured distance to exchange greetings on her own, appeared highly unusual.

This independent and autonomous conduct by Ju-ae is unprecedented and unfamiliar. At times, there even appeared to be more aides surrounding Ju-ae than Kim Jong Un. The scenes conveyed an impression that the number of followers gravitating toward Ju-ae may even exceed those around Kim, suggesting an expansion of her power base.

Ju-ae’s demeanor appeared relaxed and confident. Particularly striking were scenes in which she watched performances with Air Force pilots and senior North Korean officials, seemingly enjoying herself. Kim Yo-jong, a member of the so-called “Baekdu bloodline,” was seated in a relatively marginal position, while Ju-ae sat with Kim Jong Un in the very center, close beside him—at the very heart of power. This gave the strong impression that the succession structure centered on Ju-ae is advancing at a rapid pace.

Why, then, is North Korea rushing to establish Ju-ae as the successor? Why push ahead with succession preparations for a child estimated to be only about 13 years old, when Kim Jong Un, born on January 8, 1983, will be just 42 years old as of January 8, 2026?

There are several possible reasons.

First, North Korea is undergoing rapid generational change. A major demographic shift has begun, with the elderly generation that experienced the Korean War exiting the stage and the MZ generation and Alpha generation emerging. As a result, loyalty to forcibly imposed Juche ideology, hostility toward South Korea rooted in the Korean War, militaristic aggressiveness, and allegiance to a coercive system have all sharply declined. The regime has become desperate to secure support from younger generations in order to maintain the system. This makes it inevitable to promote a leader who can appeal to the new generation at an early stage.

This is one reason for accelerating the early succession process centered on the young Kim Ju-ae. It also demonstrates that the Cold War–style Juche indoctrination and repression employed under Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il no longer resonate with North Korea’s younger generations. There are even intelligence reports suggesting that oppressive rule is provoking resistance and backlash against the system among young soldiers.

Second, analysts suggest that Kim Jong Un is adopting a “Chinese-style model” to elevate his regime to a higher level. Just as China positioned Xi Jinping as president while entrusting day-to-day administration to Premier Li Qiang, North Korea may be following a similar model—raising Kim Jong Un to a presidential or chairman-level role akin to Xi’s governing structure.

Third, North Korea’s past experience with power transitions is a factor. Kim Il Sung established Kim Jong Il early as his successor and managed a relatively stable transfer of power. Kim Jong Il, however, failed to finalize a succession plan early, leading to significant turbulence during the transition to Kim Jong Un, including severe internal instability amid the regency and purge of Jang Song-thaek. Learning from this experience, regime guardians may believe it is necessary to make Kim Jong Un’s own succession plan visible at an early stage, thereby accelerating Ju-ae’s emergence.

Fourth, after completing its nuclear force, enshrining nuclear weapons in the constitution, and advancing the “two hostile states” doctrine to thoroughly block external influence, North Korea is focusing on internal discipline while seeking to shed its image as a pariah state defined by “military-first politics” and hardline dictatorship. This strategy—aimed at presenting itself as a new, attractive, next-generation state—also aligns with a “new-generation South Korea strategy” designed to appeal to young people in South Korea. In step with the globalization of Korean pop culture represented by BTS, Blackpink, and NewJeans, North Korea appears eager to construct a form of “next-generation leadership” that can appeal to younger audiences worldwide, drawing the attention of global youth sensibilities toward North Korea.

Ju-ae’s appearances are likely to increase further. Kim Jong Un, meanwhile, appears to be elevating himself to a higher tier—ruler, chairman, and kingmaker—much as China elevated Xi Jinping toward a Mao Zedong–like position, thereby moving his own status closer to that once held by Kim Il Sung.

While the Lee Jae-myung administration is, in the author’s view, mired in accusations of “manufactured insurrection,” leading to the erosion of the overall state system, North Korea—South Korea’s adversary—is preparing far-reaching, preemptive measures to strengthen its state structure. As Lee Jae-myung–style politics, characterized by insurrection rhetoric, undermines South Korea’s rule of law and liberal democratic system from within, the enemy state’s system is becoming ever more consolidated.

North Korea is obsessed with a future-oriented national strategy aimed at eliminating potential political turmoil and systemic instability by establishing Ju-ae’s succession structure at an early stage. By contrast, Lee Jae-myung’s politics, the author argues, are accelerating political chaos and systemic instability.

It is time to pay closer attention to Kim Ju-ae’s movements. North Korea is already preparing for the future.


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